

Report by Major Mockett.

1. *Operations against Grodno.* – These operations were completely successful; the town was entered at about 9 P.M. on the 25th September.

Considerable opposition was offered, especially in the final stages, when machine-guns, placed on the right bank of the Niemen, prevented the passage of the river until dark and much hindered bridging operations.

Actually the plan was not to press the attack from the south or west, but to envelop the town from the north; this necessitated a wide turning movement passing through a small strip of Lithuanian territory. Very few prisoners were taken and little war material in Grodno itself; it is hoped, however, that many prisoners and much material will ultimately be taken when the wide enveloping movement by Orany in the north and Mosti (on the Niemen) – Lida in the south is completed.

The Polish offensive anticipated the Bolshevik offensive in this theatre by twenty-four hours.

Twenty per cent, of the Bolshevik troops concentrated for this offensive are Communists. Bolshevik troops were assured that by this offensive they would capture Warsaw.

By anticipating the Bolshevik offensive the Poles have completely disorganised the enemy's concentration and much disorder reigns. A general retreat has been ordered.

In my opinion the Poles have far too few cavalry to profit to the full by the confusion brought about by their offensive. Only two brigades of cavalry are available; these are operating on the left flank. On the right, the true strategic flank, they have no cavalry whatever.

It is anticipated that Lida will be in Polish hands by the 27th or 28th September, too late to enable them to reap the full fruits of victory.

Although the Communist divisions are fighting very well, the reformed divisions from the Bolshevik *debâcle* and escaped prisoners from Germany are of little value.

In order to make them face the Poles, Communists are placed in rear with machine-guns. Even so, large numbers, including officers, are deserting and fleeing eastwards. A number, whom I have spoken to, are deserting to the Poles.

I interviewed prisoners from the following divisions: 5th Siberian Division, now longer composed of Siberians. The recruits come largely from the Smolensk

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district. They were captured near Mosti (on the Niemen); they state that they were brought to Lida in closed trucks, but their *moral* is very bad. I knew this division in May and June last, when they were considered one of the best divisions in the Red Army.

11th Division, area Podlipki (south-west of Grodno), *moral* very bad.

56th Division, Grodno front, *moral* fair. The Commissars in this division told them that the coming offensive would take them through Warsaw to Berlin, where their friends would join them and march to London. They were also told that if they retreated they would be shot. That Poles tortured and killed all prisoners and deserters. Their food was very bad; they had had no bread for four days, and were told to take it from the peasants.

6th Division as 56th Division in every particular.

2. *The Polish Troops.* – The *moral* is excellent, and the plan was well carried out. Organisation regarding repairs to bridges is, however, very bad. The bridging park is far too far behind, and repairs executed very slowly.

3. *The Lithuanians.* – It appears that orders had been issued to Lithuanian troops not to fire on the Poles. These orders, however, were not always adhered to. The Poles likewise had orders not to fire on Lithuanian troops unless the latter interfered with their operations against Grodno. As far as I can gather, the passage of Polish troops through a portion of Lithuanian territory passed without incident. Lithuanian troops, however, were found in Polish territory; these surrendered with little or no fighting. About 2,500 Lithuanians are at present prisoners in Polish hands; they are, however, being treated with every consideration. The officers dine at the best hotel in Bialystok at Polish expense, and have almost complete freedom and walk about in groups accompanied by a Polish officer. They have stated that they are very well treated. They number about forty. The rank and file receive the same food as Polish soldiers. I have suggested that as Lithuania and Poland are not at war it would be a very diplomatic act if all Lithuanian prisoners were released immediately the operations round Grodno are completed, thus showing the Lithuanian Government that Poland desires peace and not war, and wishes to live on the best of terms with her neighbour.

It appears that Lithuanian troops were in several places beyond the Conference and Foch lines, such as at Adamowicze and Lososna, just west of Grodno. It further appears that the Lithuanians and Bolsheviks at Grodno did not agree; the

latter tried to interfere with the discipline of the Lithuanian army, and suggested that the soldiers should remove their officers' rank badges. There were other causes which were certain to occur. The Bolsheviks in Grodno spoke freely of the Lithuanians as their allies.

The Lithuanians are reported to have had a telephone at Grodno station.

No Lithuanian troops were in Grodno itself, the nearest being about 5 kilom. distant.

A few Lithuanian wounded were brought to a hospital in Grodno, but I did not see them.

I have established beyond doubt that the Bolsheviks used the Vilna–Grodno railways to the last for war material and troops. When the latter town was evacuated, however, trains went to Lida and not Vilna.

3. *Grodno*. – That portion of the town on the left bank of the Niemen is completely destroyed. All permanent bridges destroyed. Two wooden bridges, one foot and the other for wheel transport, remain. Forty German engineers came to inspect the destroyed railway bridge with a view to repairing it; this took place shortly after the capture of the town.

The inhabitants of Grodno saw many German Spartacus troops in the town, many without arms, which they expected to receive from the Bolsheviks. None had food and only a few money. They were not very pleased at their reception by the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik soldiers openly stated that they were tired of the Soviet form of Government and wanted a true Democratic Russian Government. No shops were opened in Grodno during the ten weeks of Bolshevik occupation.

The Bolsheviks robbed everything, and when they finally evacuated the town they destroyed all they could not remove. The hotels and principal residences are mere wrecks.

The Tchrezvychaika functioned at the Royal Hotel. Courts of enquiry were frequently held after the death sentence had been carried out. Compared to Wilna,

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few were executed, certainly not exceeding seventy. The Jews, as usual, played a leading part in pointing out those who ought to be executed. A few rich Jews were shot.

The town is destitute, no food can be bought and cholera has broken out. In my opinion this is probably dysentery, wrongly termed cholera.

4. *General Remarks*. – The Bolsheviks threw three railway engines and one armoured train into the Niemen. These were on the wrong side of the river and could therefore not be evacuated. After the fall of Wilna the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Gaiakhan passed southwards through Olita (Lithuanian territory) and enveloped Grodno from the west.

5. *My Intentions*. – After the capture of Grodno I left for Bialystok in order to buy food, as none was to be had locally. I am now accompanying Polish cavalry marching on Lida. Telegrams should be addressed "Britmis, Grodno." I have arranged to keep in touch with 11th Army Headquarters, which is moving to Grodno.

H. B. MOCKETT, Major,

British Military Mission.

Grodno, September 26, 1920.

Report from Major Mockett respecting Polish Operations against Bolshevik Forces in the Neighbourhood of Lida.

1. WHAT will probably prove to be the severest battle of the war between Poland and the Red Armies was fought in the neighbourhood of Lida from night of the 27th–28th September to night of the 28th–29th. The battle is better described as a series of engagements fought out with great bitterness and covering a period of more than twenty-four hours.

I have never known the Polish soldier fight with greater gallantry, and that too against odds of three to one. I certainly have seen nothing approaching the number of dead Bolsheviks; the woods and roads are full of corpses in the area of the fighting. The Poles also suffered heavy casualties, which is not surprising in view of the fact that much of the fighting took place with the bayonet. The enemy's losses cannot yet be accurately estimated; up to tonight (the 29th September), 8,000 prisoners and 40 guns

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have been counted – together with the entire transport of 21st and 56th divisions, but many more prisoners remain to be collected. I estimate the figure will ultimately reach about 12,000 with 100 guns, taken in the encounters described. The prisoners come from the following divisions: –

21st and 56th Divisions. – Composed largely of Communists, led by old Russian officers and Jew commissars; two of the best divisions in the Red Armies. Totally destroyed, all guns captured, together with transport.

2nd, 6th and 6th Divisions. – Not up to the standard of above. A considerable number succeeded in escaping, but only after very rough handling and loss of prisoners and guns.

31st Division. – A new division composed of Kuban Cossacks, one brigade killed, captured or dispersed; other two brigades fled. This division played no leading part in these operations.

I have also interviewed prisoners from 11th and 16th Divisions.

Operations round Lida.

2. Forces engaged –

(a.) Polish; 1st Legion Division, 1st White Russian Division, 4th Brigade Cavalry.

(b.) Bolsheviks : 2nd, 5th, 6th, 21st and 56th Infantry Divisions.

Map reference: 1:300,000.

The Bolshevik High Command had issued orders that Lida was to be held at all costs, and if lost to be retaken. The 1st Legion Division was marching on Lida from the north, with 4th Cavalry Brigade on its left, which in turn had sent a detachment to cut the Lida–Molodeczno railway.

The White Russian Division was marching on Lida from the south-west along the main road Grodno–Lida. The 21st and 56th Divisions were north of Grodno–Lida road, retiring on Lida. The 2nd, 5th and 6th Bolshevik Divisions were along the Dzitwa River, south and south-west, of Lida.

On the night of the 27th and early morning of the 28th September the White Russian Division was heavily attacked by the 56th Division, 3 kilom. east of Papiernia (23 kilom. south-west of Lida), hand-to-hand fighting took place, eight guns were captured, a considerable number of Bolsheviks killed and about 500 prisoners taken. After this engagement the White Russian Division entrenched, as other enemy divisions were known to be retreating on Lida. They knew nothing of the situation in and around Lida. On the morning of the 28th September, after the encounter described above, the 21st and 56th Bolshevik Divisions retired on Lida. As already stated, the White Division had entrenched themselves and, further, took no steps to ascertain what was happening in Lida, although they were aware of the fact that the 1st Legion Division was advancing on that town. Accordingly I decided to push on and obtain information. At about 16 hours I learnt from a peasant that Lida had been evacuated by the Bolsheviks on the night of the 27th–28th September and no Polish troops had entered the town.

On approaching the Dzitwa river, at a point about 10 kilom. from Lida, I found Bolshevik troops in considerable force in the woods on both sides of the road and along the river line. I retired and informed the White Russian Division, at the same time urging them to advance; they, however, decided to stay where they were.

In the meantime, the 6th Regiment of the 1st Legion Division had entered Lida at 12 hours on the 28th September, finding it evacuated. Early that afternoon they were attacked by the 2nd, 5th and 6th Bolshevik Divisions. After a severe engagement the Bolsheviks retreated in the direction of Nowogrodek, losing many killed and prisoners. These divisions played no further part in these operations; had they renewed their attack that evening the ultimate result of this battle would probably have been very different.

Late in the afternoon of the same day the 21st and 56th Divisions retired on Lida and had a heavy engagement with the

6th Regiment of 1st Legion Division on the outskirts of the town and succeeded in getting a footing in Lida, but were eventually thrown out and retired south-west, only to encounter the White Russian Division once more in their entrenched position. Again heavy fighting took place, in which they suffered

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heavy casualties in killed and prisoners. Subsequently they retired in a north-easterly direction in an endeavour to break through, but at Krupa, 10 kilom. north-west of Lida, they encountered the 4th Cavalry Brigade, who drove them back, and once more retreated on Lida in an attempt to escape, but were again repulsed after gaining a footing in the town a second time. This time they retreated northwards, encountering the transport with escort of 1st Legion Division; as a result of the fight which took place in the night, they were forced back in a westerly direction. In the neighbourhood of Krupa, where they had already fought one engagement, they met the two remaining regiments of the 1st Legion Division. A very fierce engagement took place lasting till the morning of the 29th September. Finding retreat cut in every direction they surrendered, together with the whole of their artillery and transport. At one time it appeared that the 1st Legion Division would be overwhelmed; repeatedly the Bolsheviks charged with the bayonet, cheering loudly, only to be stopped and driven back. Officers agree that they have never seen troops fight better than these Bolshevik divisions, who were up to the standard of the best Russians of the old army. Since then no further fighting has taken place. Two Bolshevik aeroplanes have, however, bombed the town and machine-gunned transport this afternoon (29th September). I attribute the desperate fighting of the 21st and 56th Divisions to the fact that, finding their retreat cut off, they fought with the courage of despair, having been told by the Jewish commissars that the Poles killed all prisoners; apart from this, these divisions contained a large percentage of Communists.

3. *Moral.* – A Ukrainian officer of the 21st Bolshevik Division, finding retreat impossible, suggested surrendering. He was immediately shot by a Jewish commissar, who in turn was at once killed by Bolshevik soldiers. Bolshevik soldiers in Lida are reported by both Poles and Jews as saying, "Down with the Jewish commissars! Down with the Jews!" At the commencement of this Polish offensive the Bolshevik *moral* was excellent, it has now been shattered and will be hard to re-establish. Several divisions are now mixed up in the area of Nowogrodek, south-east of Lida. I anticipate a general retreat to the Berezina.

4. *Lida.* – Like every other town which has suffered Bolshevik occupation, Lida is dead. No shops have been opened during the entire occupation. Only Polish marks were accepted when any purchase took place. The town, always squalid, is indescribably filthy and insanitary. Much sickness prevails. The population is for the most part Jewish, and being international, they are on the side of whoever happens to be the victor. As far as I have seen, the behaviour of Polish troops in the town has been good. Numbers of Bolsheviks, died of wounds, have been found in the houses, in some cases lying side by side with wounded left behind in the retreat. As a result of the fighting many dead lie in the street, together with horses. It is reported that General Officer Commanding IIIrd Bolshevik Army committed suicide in Lida; he was left behind either wounded or sick.

5. *Spartacus Troops.* – I have collected reliable evidence regarding the presence of Spartacus troops in Lida. It is impossible to gain an accurate estimate of numbers.

6. *Lithuanians.* – I have seen several Lithuanian officers and men in Lida, captured not far from the town. Some of these, it is stated, were actually taken with the 21st Bolshevik Division.

7. *Bolshevik Communications.* – The railway Lida–Vilna cut;

The railway Lida–Molodeczno cut;

The retreat follows roads leading to Molodeczno–Nowogrodek–Minsk.

8. *Bolshevik Atrocities.* – I have seen the bodies of 3 officers and 36 men of the White Russian Division who were murdered by the Bolsheviks after being taken prisoner; several had obviously been wounded as is proved by their bandages. Some were battered to death, others hideously mutilated. I have spoken to an officer and some men who managed to escape from the same batch of prisoners; they state that a Jewish commissar gave the order whilst they were being marched down a road past a company of Bolsheviks. Another commissar (not a Jew) suggested sparing them in view of the fact that they themselves were very likely to be captured, but this suggestion was overruled. I understand the commissar who gave the order has been taken prisoner. The 7th Regiment of 2nd Division are responsible for this atrocity.

9. *Intention.* – I am proceeding tomorrow to Nowogrodek (the 30th September), and shall accompany the cavalry (2nd and 4th Brigades) if roads permit.

H. B. MOCKETT, Major, 4th Hussars,

British Military Mission in Poland.

Lida, September 29, 1920.

Report by Sir P. Loraine.

In accordance with your instructions I yesterday visited a Bolshevik prisoners camp, which I found with some difficulty, in the outer forts of the fortified area of Modlin (Nowo Giorgiewsk). The prisoners whom I interrogated were:—

1. A former warrant officer in the Imperial Russian army, who has been serving as quartermaster-sergeant in the 472nd Bolshevik infantry regiment.
2. A cadet officer in the 181st infantry regiment of the Imperial army, who has been commanding a company of telegraphists attached to the staff of the fourth Bolshevik army.
3. A non-commissioned officer, formerly belonging to the 3rd infantry brigade of the Imperial Russian army and serving as a telephonist in the Bolshevik army.
4. A former railway conductor in the Imperial Russian railways, serving as a private in the Bolshevik army. This man was a very intelligent Jew, who hated the Bolsheviks because he was well off and had been forcibly taken for military service in 1917.
5. A former non-commissioned officer in the Imperial army, now a private in the Bolshevik A.S.C. This man is a singular case of someone who was perfectly happy under the Soviet regime, and whose one desire is to return to it. It is fair to add that he was not a Communist and took no interest whatever in politics.
6. A private in the Imperial Russian army, serving as a non-commissioned officer in the 154th Soviet regiment, a baker by profession, hates Bolshevism, and all his attempts at desertion have hitherto been frustrated.

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7. A quartermaster-sergeant, formerly a university student, well educated and intelligent, loathes Bolshevism.

I made strict enquiries to ascertain whether there were any genuine Communists or Commissaires among the prisoners, but it was extremely difficult to get any satisfactory information, as the prisoners had very recently been moved there from the north bank of the Narew, fresh lots were coming in almost hourly, the Polish guard was very small and had not yet been able to register or even to count the prisoners under their charge. It appears, moreover, that Communists and Commissaires when taken prisoner are very reluctant to admit their identity. The Jew mentioned above (No. 4), however, characteristically denounced one fellow-prisoner as a Communist battalion commander. Unfortunately the latter could not be found, although I stayed in the camp till after 8 P.M., but his name has been noted and he will probably be brought to Warsaw for interrogation by the General Staff. I have expressed the hope that he may be held at your disposal should you wish to interrogate him yourself.

I will summarise the information given me on the seven questions which you asked me to put:—

1. Stores of Grain in Russia.

All prisoners stated that this must be extremely low, but I could get no information about the Ukraine.

2. What Enthusiasm or Conviction is there for the Soviet Government ?

None.

There is, however, a genuine respect for Lenin, who is regarded as the working-man's friend and is held up in sharp contrast to Trotsky, who is generally detested and feared. It was rather curious to note, however, that all these men, whom I questioned out of ear-shot of the others, were unanimously agreed that, even if peace came, the Soviet Government was too strong to be upset, at all events for some time yet. The bellicose school under Trotsky has evidently got a strong hold, and has now got to the stage where it can only live by war. So long as there is war, the driving force is exerted by the Commissaires, backed by the Chinese units which are placed at their disposal, and by the terror which the Chresvytchajka and its network of spies and denunciators inspires. When I mentioned this dreaded institution the prisoners at once lowered their voices, and the simpler ones could hardly believe me when I told them there was no such institution in Poland. It is thought that, even if peace is re-established, Trotsky has rendered such services and acquired so strong a position that Lenin will be unable to get rid of him. There have been many tentative revolts, but the spy system renders any co-operation impossible, and it has not therefore been difficult to suppress isolated attempts, e.g., in No. 1's regiment fifty men were shot for refusing to go to the Polish front. Industrial workmen are now hostile to the Soviet Government; there was a strike in the Putilof works at Petrograd in April for better food; it was ruthlessly suppressed.

3. What are the feelings towards the Jews and the Jewish Commissaires ?

Universal detestation and fear of the latter.

I also enquired what was the attitude of the Polish Jews towards the Bolshevik troops. The reply was: Obsequious and obliging, but no ill spoken of the Poles.

4. Are you well fed in captivity ?

Food hitherto insufficient. It is quite possible that the Poles have not yet had time to organise the food supply sufficiently. Lieutenant Lubienski will report on this to the Polish General Staff.

5. What food do you get per day ?

The average seems to have been about 4 lb. of bread during ten days and a few vegetables of doubtful quality. The men looked tired as a rule but not actually starved.

6. Are you fairly well treated ?

No complaints whatever in this respect; indeed No. 7 said that he was astonished at the excellent behaviour of the Polish soldiers. He had seen no case

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whatever of ill-treatment or violence towards the prisoners, and expressed the personal opinion that the Poles would do better to be more severe. On the way out of the camp our motor got stuck in a sand road, and a party of mixed Poles and Bolshevik prisoners came running out all mixed up and perfectly cheerful and were as happy as sand boys pushing the car along.

7. What is in Russia—

(a.) Requisition price of wheat ?

(b.) The open market or illicit price ?

The information which I got from the two quartermaster-sergeants ought to be accurate on this point. The requisitioning price for bread was 67 roubles per pood. To buy illicit bread costs 20,000 roubles a pood (16.4 kilog.), and there is no open market. In Petrograd three months ago the price of meat (illicit, of course) was 1,200 roubles per lb., i.e., 48,000 roubles per pood, and of illicit sugar, 2,500 roubles per lb., i.e., 100,000 roubles per pood.

The Bolshevik armies took no supply train with them, and were exclusively fed by local requisition. This was conducted by special committees; the distribution was perfectly fair. No individual soldier or officer could requisition. Each peasant was left one month's supply of bread at the rate of 1 lb. per day, the rest was taken. Each peasant was left with one cow, the rest being requisitioned. All grain was requisitioned. When the Bolshevik armies got into Poland their rations were increased and they fed better. They got 2 lb. of bread a day in Poland as against 1¼ or 1½ in Russia, meat and sugar occasionally when available, never any tea, sometimes vegetables. The telegraphist captain told me that all telegraph and telephone material was confiscated without compensation.

No. 4 (the Jew) made some interesting statements about railways. All private travelling has been suspended. An individual can only travel by a special order, and this can only be obtained by Communists and issued by commissaires. Nobody suspected of anti-Bolshevism can get such an order. There are no tickets for sale. The railway service is completely chaotic, although quite a number of trains are still in circulation, and run eastwards from Moscow as far as Omsk, but nobody knows when they will get anywhere. The carriages are filthy, and only commissaires and powerful Communists can travel in first or second class carriages. The fuel is wood.

No. 5 came from the Tambof Government from a small country town where he had been completely happy under the Soviet regime. There were no commissaires, nobody interfered with them, and there were evidently a few intelligent people who had developed the Russian village communal system; proper exchanges had been established between the urban and rural co-operatives, one of which latter he directed. He had to work hard but could make a comfortable living, and he said all the people in his district were "good people," his one hope was to be able to return there. There was a system of licensed purchasers who were allowed to buy so much of their various needs each month. But only "good people" could secure the licence. When he was taken for the army in June he was very angry.

No. 7, the most intelligent of the prisoners whom I questioned, smiled broadly when I asked whether the Bolsheviks had any real intention of making peace with Poland. He said that the last army order had been "to finish off the Polish army" and take Warsaw. He at all events realised that, despite the promises of the commissaires, even the capture of Warsaw would not have meant peace, but that the next order after that would have been to march on to the German frontier. There was not the slightest doubt in his mind about this, for then, they said, all Europe would come to their side.

None of these men had any idea of the extent of the Bolshevik disaster, though they knew something had gone wrong, and mostly grinned with pleasure when informed of it.

PERCY LORAINE,

Warsaw, August 24, 1920.

Memorandum on War as Waged in Poland.

IT would be a profound mistake to regard the war which is now being carried on in Poland as being similar, in any essential particular, to the great war which has just come to an end. It belongs to a totally different period – probably some

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200 or 300 years earlier – and is to be classified by its leading characteristics as connected with a totally different period of civilisation, and with a different stage in the development of the art of war.

In a previous communication I stated that both the Polish and the Soviet armies were essentially mediaeval, and I see no reason to modify that view. They are mediaeval in the sense that there is no particular animosity or rancour between the mass of the combatants on each side. They are in the fight either through force and fear of being shot at home, or because there is no other immediately available means of livelihood. In the Soviet army, at any rate, there is no particular enthusiasm for the cause for which they are fighting, and there is definite hatred for the direct representatives of that cause.

As regards the actual combat, it may be said that the fighting is less brutal and more elegant than it was in the great war; there are no savage attacks, there is no question of any heroic resistance. It is a war of manoeuvre and not of position. The game of war is conducted on lines similar to chess between high-class players – directly one side has a serious advantage the other side resigns and withdraws to another table or another field. When they are considerably outnumbered, or out-manoeuvred, or out-flanked, the troops either retire or surrender: no authority among their officers is sufficient to induce them to take any other course. Thus the number of killed and wounded during the late fighting, compared with the enormous results obtained, is very small when judged by European standards. This is the more noteworthy when one considers that the effect on the world's history of the battle of Warsaw may not be less decisive than that of the battle of Tours or the battle of Vienna in 1684.

The mobility of the troops on both sides is great, that of the Poles particularly so. They cover distances quite unattainable by the best European armies, on very poor rations, with very poor boots. Their mobility is greatly increased by the fact that they are usually accompanied by light country carts – two ponies harnessed to a ramshackle four-wheeled vehicle, on lines somewhat similar to a miniature brewer's dray, which rattles along behind the troops almost day and night, picks up the weary and footsore, and gives the others an occasional lift. These country carts are also used to take captured prisoners back from the front – the drivers being generally willing to give anybody a lift, whether friend or captured enemy.

Nature of the Country.

Poland, of course, is an ideal country to fight in. I have not seen any European general, particularly any general of cavalry, whose mouth has not watered on surveying it. You can ride almost anywhere, there are no big obstacles, there is just enough wood to afford concealment and facilitate surprise, the rivers are few and just difficult enough to cross to afford some scope for ingenuity and engineering knowledge. It is essentially a country for military manoeuvre, and it is by manoeuvring capacity and by mobility that battles are won here.

It occurs to me, indeed, that if the League of Nations is not altogether successful on the original lines, it might, by a slight alteration of its present constitution, select Poland as an arena for a trial by arms between selected teams of potential litigants.

Prisoners.

Nothing illustrates more correctly the general nature of the warfare than the attitude of prisoners and the methods of treatment applied to them. The general attitude of the Soviet prisoners I have seen – and I have seen large numbers of them at various stages of captivity, from five minutes after capture to six months – is that of relief and of relative contentment. They realise that they are more or less safe, that they will have adequate, if not abundant, food, that there will be no Jews to shoot them if they run away, or Chinese to torture them if they offend or speak evil of the Soviet. It is true that they have lost their chance of the pleasures of war, but they are apathetic about the joys of victory, they realise from past experience that the ultimate profit from sacking a town is greater in theory than in fact, and that the allied and associated pleasures may easily be over-rated.

The Polish officers and authorities, so far as I have seen, are neither hard nor cruel. They treat the prisoners just as well as they treat their own soldiers, and the prisoners show no signs of being afraid of them.

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A certain amount of work is got out of the prisoners, but it appears to be of a very mild and light kind. I have tasted the bread on which they are fed – a pound and a half a day is the allowance – and it is not at all bad. They have vegetable soup at midday, they have coffee in the morning, and marmalade with their bread for supper. At one camp which I

visited, quite without previous warning, I found a large blackboard on the wall with the day's menu, just like a restaurant.

I perceived very little resentment against the ordinary prisoners on the part of the villagers, although they would kill a commissaire. They talked with the former quite affably, and gave them a lift back from the front to prison on their carts, their common hatred of Jewish commissaires and usurers making them wondrous kind. One soldier with a bayonet is often given charge of a squad of twenty or thirty prisoners; sometimes an unarmed peasant would bring in two or three armed Bolsheviks.

This friendly attitude on the part of the villagers to individual prisoners of the rank and file must not be taken to mean that there is no resentment on the part of the Polish peasant population against the higher Soviet authorities. There is considerable resentment against these, partaking to some extent of the nature of the disappointment which proceeds from misplaced love. There is no doubt that among large sections of the Polish peasant population, particularly the poorer sections, a very active Bolshevik propaganda had produced a certain effect. It led the peasants to expect they would get their land free, that they would not have to pay any rent, that they would sell their produce at high rates, and that all bourgeois and "noble" property would be confiscated, and distributed among them.

The net result of the Bolshevik invasion has been a severe disappointment. The Bolsheviks requisitioned, and paid derisive prices in paper for, large amounts of cattle, horses and produce. The millennium has not arrived – the noble and the bourgeois have returned.

There is a strong tendency towards mild acquiescence to any regime in all Eastern countries, and this spirit now works to reconcile the peasants to contentment with the course of events.

The Attitude of the Population of Warsaw.

The attitude of the population of Warsaw towards the battle is incomprehensible to a European. On Friday the 13th August Warsaw was on the edge of a catastrophe; by the 20th August Poland had achieved a brilliant and far-reaching victory. Yet on the first date there were no signs of panic or of disquietude; on the latter date there were no signs of jubilation or even of relief. If any difference at all was to be observed it was that there was more singing by soldiers in the streets on the first date than on the last. In the hour of triumph no crowds paraded the streets and there were none of the outward signs of enthusiasm or national elation. The explanation is probably to be found in a curious combination of fatalism and insouciance and in the fact that the large majority of the population, even among the intelligent classes – and these are numerous in Poland – do not realise at all what is going on. They are always inclined to think that everything will come right provided they do nothing.

There is another national trait, which is very curious. Any impartial observer will admit that General Weygand has rendered most valuable services to the war by his firmness and his military advice. The first result on Polish politicians has been this – that the Opposition have tried to make him a great hero in order to diminish the popularity and prestige of Marshal Pilsudski, while the friends of Marshal Pilsudski who are now in power thanked him, not for the services he has rendered to the country, but for having declined to allow himself to be made the tool of party politics, and for having attributed all the praise to the Polish command and the Polish General Staff.

I should add that, before his departure, the general population both of Warsaw and at Cracow made very handsome amends for the earlier attitude of the politicians towards the Allied Mission.

Notes on the Battle of Warsaw.

The Bolshevik strategy, on invading ethnographical Poland, was faulty in the extreme. Instead of concentrating upon the capture of Warsaw and marching direct for it, they distributed their strength on several objectives –

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(a.) Cutting the corridor between Danzig and Warsaw, probably near Graudenz, and with this end sending a considerable force along the German frontier. Endeavouring to cross the Vistula at Vlotslavsk and Plutsk. Endeavouring to cross the Vistula above Warsaw at Kora-Kalvariya.

Some authorities think that the latter move was the most fatal of all – others attach greater importance to faulty operations on the Soviet right. Instead of concentrating all their forces on the north-east of Warsaw for a vigorous attack at Radzymin they diverted a considerable portion of the available strength in order to get across the Vistula both above and below Warsaw. Even as it was, the attack on Radzymin nearly succeeded. Without the diverted forces it almost certainly would have succeeded.

Although only carried out with a small force, the diversion to Kora-Kalvariya, which is about 20 kilom. above Warsaw (which may be compared with von Kluck's diagonal march to the south-east instead of marching direct on Paris) played straight into the hands of the Poles, who happened to have in reserve, to the south-east of Warsaw, a large concealed force with which they intended to take the attacking Russians in flank.

The Soviet troops advancing to Kora-Kalvariya were taken in flank and rear by this force, which advanced from Garvolin, Jeলেখov and Radzin (not to be confused with Radzymin, which is due north of Warsaw), and were cut to

pieces in a very short time.

This, together with the failure of direct attack at Radzymin, and the counter-attack by General Sikorski from Novo-Georgievsk, cutting into the left flank of the Russian right from an interior lines position, really determined the fate of the whole battle.

It may be asked why the simple plan of direct attack was not pushed through by the Soviet leaders. The answer is probably two-fold : –

(a.) The tradition in this part of the world – and tradition sways even Communists – is that Warsaw is much more difficult to take from the north or right bank of the Vistula than it is from the south or left bank;

(b.) The Bolsheviks aimed at not only capturing Warsaw but capturing in Warsaw the Government, the Diplomatic Corps and as large a proportion as possible of the richer bourgeois and nobility. By such capture they thought to render further resistance by Poland less vigorous if not impossible.

As regards the Polish plan of defence, the following observations may be made:

The Polish command took a considerable risk in leaving so weak a defence on the direct line of attack at Radzymin. It was indispensable for the success of their plans that the forces round Warsaw should hold up the Russian attack for at least three days. As a matter of fact they did so, but it was touch and go. The Soviets were through the second line of defence at one spot on the night of the 15th August.

The Polish plan was devised to give the possibility of an overwhelming Soviet defeat and of utilising to the full the qualities of the Polish troops, which are thought to be superior for attack as compared with their qualities for defence.

The result has been a most brilliant and overwhelming success, for which great credit is due to the Polish commanders who devised the plan, and to General Weygand who improved it in many directions and who certainly contributed vastly to its successful execution.

Great credit is also due to officers of the French Mission, whose work during the battle was of decisive service.

Without General Weygand, who insisted on the Poles adopting a definite plan and sticking to it – and who also introduced the novelty (for Poland) of written orders to commanders of troops – and vastly improved, if he did not create, a liaison service between units, and without the French officers, it is most doubtful whether success would have been attained.

In one case within my knowledge French officers used their canes to rally retreating troops. The Polish soldiers were delighted at this and said, "At last, somebody is taking an interest in the work."

August 27, 1920.

This is part of a full report on Poland, undated but apparently from about May 1920.

The Polish Navy.

123. The personnel of the Polish navy consists of about 1,500 officers and men, of whom about 90 officers and 500 men are fully trained.

124. The Polish navy at present has only a few motor boats, which are employed against the Bolsheviks. The Poles have ordered four small monitors from a German firm at Danzig, the first of which is expected to be ready at the beginning of May. The Polish Government wished to purchase some small monitors from the British Admiralty, but there are none available. In the autumn the Polish Government applied through the naval mission for 1 light cruiser, 4 destroyers, 2 submarines, 6 mine-sweepers, 8 small monitors and 2 hulks and coastal motor boats. His Majesty's Government decided, however, through the Peace Delegation at Paris, that the Polish Government could be allowed to receive motor launches, but neither coastal motor boats nor submarines or mine-sweepers. The Admiralty intimated that it could supply 1 light cruiser, 2 hulks, as many motor launches as required and eventually 4 destroyers. I understand that the Supreme Council in considering the disposal of enemy warships has decided that some vessels are to be handed over to Poland.

125. The Polish Naval Department are making arrangements to send some Polish youths to Pangbourne to undergo training for the Polish mercantile marine. They were also anxious to send about ten sub-lieutenants, mostly from the former Russian navy, whose courses have not been completed, to go through courses at Portsmouth and Cambridge. The Admiralty, however, are unable to take these officers at present. The Polish Naval Department now wish to send them straight to sea-going ships for six months, and the Admiralty have been asked whether this can be done. The Polish Naval Department wish to establish as soon as possible a training college at Danzig for the mercantile marine, with an English naval officer as head of the college. This matter is now under discussion, and provision is being made for it in the new Polish budget.

126. At present the wireless telegraphy service is entirely under the military authorities, but in the course of February two technical officers and several men will be transferred to the naval service, and a small shore station in the neighbourhood of Danzig will be turned over entirely for this service.

127. The Polish Government are, I understand, going to ask the British Naval Mission to draw up a scheme for the handling of some 4,000,000 tons of imports which are annually expected at Danzig.

The Polish Army.

128. At the moment of the independence of Poland the Polish army was divided into two parts: (1) about 40,000 men under General Pilsudski in Congress Poland; (2) about 80,000 men under General Haller in France. During the German occupation of Poland the Polish forces in Congress Poland were under their orders, and the Poles as a whole were then reluctant to enlist therein. After the German forces had been ejected, General Pilsudski called for volunteers and obtained a further 56,000 men. A Conscription Bill was passed by the Polish Diet in April 1919 and the 1898 class was called up, which yielded 72,000 recruits.

129. In December 1918 the German forces and authorities were ejected from Posnania, and by the middle of April 1919 a Polish Posnanian army of 53,000 troops had been formed; thus when General Haller's army began to arrive from France in April 1919 the strength of the Polish army was about 173,000 officers and men in Congress Poland and Galicia, and 53,000 troops in Posnania. General Haller's army, which began to reach Poland from France in April 1919, finished its transit through Germany by June 1919, and added 60,000 troops to the Polish forces. In September 1919, when the Posnanian Government had ceased to be independent, both the Posnanian and General Haller's armies were merged into the main Polish army. On the 6th August, 1919, the Polish army had 174,000 troops on all fronts; by November 1919 this number had been increased to 317,400 officers and men.

130. Simultaneously with the arrival of General Haller's army the French Government sent a strong military mission under General Henrys to help the Poles to train their army. Some 1,500 French officers were sent to Poland, and these were distributed between General Henrys' Mission and General Haller's army, whilst others acted as instructors elsewhere. Of the above number 600 officers have already returned to France, including those employed with General Haller's army, the latter no longer existing as a separate organisation. The remaining officers, excluding those attached to General Henrys' Mission, are in charge of schools of instruction for officers, and are entrusted with advisory duties, and with the surveillance of the railways, &c. No French officers are in actual command of Polish troops, and as the Polish officers become capable of giving instructions to their officers the French are gradually withdrawn. The military school is under French direction. General Haller's army was never employed on the eastern front, and there is some suspicion on the part of the French that General Pilsudski deliberately side-tracked it. The French officers complain that they have little to do, and there is a certain amount of discontent amongst them in consequence.

131. The ration strength of the whole Polish army at the front and rear is about 680,000 men. This figure includes the gendarmerie. The present ration strength of the Polish army on all the fronts, according to latest returns, is, for all services, 9,900 officers and 310,000 men. The actual fighting strength is 4,150 officers and 149,600 men. Four classes of the army are already mobilised, and it is intended to call up two more shortly in order to strengthen the formations.

Whilst at the present moment the Poles would be able to clothe one of these classes, they would be unable to clothe the second class, and are without arms for either of the two classes. Although the equipment of the Polish army has improved latterly, it cannot be considered satisfactory. The Poles are still short of boots and clothing, and have no reserve with which to equip their recruits. The army is also short of small arms and ammunition, but has a sufficient supply of guns and shells for the present operations against the Bolsheviks. The morale of the troops is good, but the shortage of food and clothing is reported to be having a bad effect in some quarters, especially on the north-eastern sector. The morale of the officers apparently appears to be satisfactory, and their efficiency is increasing.

132. During the whole of the past year the Poles have steadily pushed the Bolsheviks back. Vilna was captured in 1919 when the Bolshevik troops offered a stubborn resistance and counter-attacked repeatedly. Minsk was taken in August 1919, when the Bolsheviks did not offer such a strong resistance. When in September 1919 the line of the River Dvina was reached, ill-feeling between the Lithuanians and the Poles prevented any serious attempt to take Dvinsk, chiefly because the Poles were afraid of an attack by the Lithuanians on their lines of communication.

133. A secret agreement was then made between the Poles and the Letts, the Lithuanians being purposely kept in ignorance, and Dvinsk was captured by an united Polish and Lettish attack on the 2nd January, 1920. In order to cover the town and to enable the Lettish troops to take all the territory claimed by Latvia as ethnographically hers, a further advance was made to the present line. The town of Dvinsk was captured by Polish troops and handed over to Latvian administration.

134. The Poles and the Lithuanians each appear to be afraid of the aggressive intentions of the other, and 15,000 Polish troops are consequently retained on the Polish-Lithuanian frontier. These troops will probably remain there until a definite frontier has been fixed between the two countries.

135. After being driven away from Lemberg the Ukrainians held a front against the Poles from Szepietowka to Chocim up to November 1919. Although an armistice had been arranged between the Ukrainians and the Poles on the 1st September, 1919, the Ukrainian troops also had an indefinite front against the Bolsheviks, on which a certain amount of fighting took place. However, on the collapse of Petlura's forces on the 20th November, 1919, owing to intrigues on the part of his subordinates and to pressure by Denikin, Petruszewicz, one of Petlura's generals, joined Denikin with about 30,000 men; a few Ukrainians joined the Bolsheviks, some surrendered to the Poles, whilst the remainder formed themselves into separate bands as the followers of various persons aspiring to the presidency of the Ukraine. Petlura, who was hostile to Denikin, asked to be allowed to come to Poland, and was received by the Poles, together with those Ministers who were still faithful to him.

136. By Petlura's invitation the Polish troops advanced, occupied Stary Konstantinow and Kamieneć Podolsk, and got into close touch with Denikin, but did not actually co-operate with him. On Denikin's defeat and retreat the Poles advanced further, and are now actively engaged against the Bolsheviks on the line Polonne-Letyzow-Deraznia.

137. The Polish-German front was held by Posnanian troops until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Small bombardments and minor actions continually took place until an armistice was arranged on this front in November 1919. With the exception of 5,000 troops lent by Posnanian to aid in the defence of Lemberg, and one division sent to Bobruisk, the Posnanian troops remained entirely in Posnanian until after the taking over of Thorn, Bromberg and the Polish "corridor." They are now being moved across to the Bolshevik front.

138. One division of Polish troops was kept on the Czecho-Slovak front until an armistice was signed with the Czecho-Slovaks in September 1919. At present there are only ordinary garrison troops at Biaia, Zywiec and Dziedzice.

139. The Polish tactical scheme in fighting the Bolsheviks is to break up any concentrations which the Bolsheviks may attempt to make within 15 kilom. of the front lines. In this they have been very successful, but they have not been able to prevent strong Bolshevik attacks east of Dvinsk, north and south of the Pripyt, in Volhynia and in Podolia. Counter attacks north and south of the Pripyt have yielded excellent results. The town of Mosyr was captured on the 6th March, 1920, and the railway line Vitebsk-Korosten cut.

140. The Poles have been reproached by the Russians for not holding more Bolshevik forces. Given their scanty equipment, it is difficult to see what more the Poles could have done during the past winter against the Bolsheviks than they have done. The Polish troops have proved over and over again that they are infinitely superior to the Bolshevik troops, and that they can beat the latter at any time on equal terms or even when the Bolsheviks are in a numerical superiority. But if the Bolsheviks are free to direct all their forces against the Poles, a serious situation might possibly arise owing to the latter being somewhat short of equipment, ammunition and railway material. Whilst the Polish army can be relied upon to fight well, its weak point is probably the organisation of supply and the commissariat arrangements. Communications are defective and railway material is short. Another factor which is likely to weigh with the Poles in considering operations against the Bolsheviks is the prevalence of typhus in the eastern regions.

141. In connection with the Polish army mention must be made of the "Popular Militia." This armed organisation was formed by M. Moraczewski, the former Polish Prime Minister and Socialist leader, and consisted of his partisans. These numbered about 10,000 men, and were all armed. When M. Paderewski became Prime Minister on the 19th January, 1919, this militia was retained, being well paid and clothed by the Socialist Party. The conditions of pay were in fact

better than those of the Polish troops. This "Popular Militia" was eventually dissolved by order of the Diet on the 24th July, 1919. Part of the militia was sent to the front but refused to fight, and had to be sent back. Some of the men entered the Polish Police, whilst the remainder returned to their homes with their arms.

The following is an excerpt from an extensive report on Poland for 1920

The Army.

240. The military situation at the beginning of 1920 was as follows :—

241. The Polish and Bolshevik armies faced each other on a line Mogilef on Dniester, east of Novograd Volinsk, Petrikowo, along the Beresina (where the Poles held bridgeheads at Borisof and Bobruisk), Polotsk to Dwinsk (which was captured by the Poles on the 3rd January, 1920).

242. The opening months of 1920 were marked by the gradual reinforcement of the two armies, the Bolsheviks increasing their numbers from 27,000 bayonets and sabres on the 1st January to 89,000 bayonets and sabres on the 15th April, while the Poles on the latter date had approximately 105,000 rifles and bayonets.

243. Towards the end of February local Bolshevik attacks were carried out south of the Luninetz–Mozyr railway, but met with scant success ; the capture, however, of Mozyr and Kalenkovich by the Poles necessitated vigorous Bolshevik measures, as, owing to the loss of the use of the Jitomir–Mozyr–Rogachef railway, they were obliged to use the Kief–Bakmach–Gomel line for the lateral transport of troops. Their offensive started on the 19th March with an attack directed against Mozyr, but gradually it extended to include Rovno, North Volinsk and Olevsk as objectives. At the same time the Bolsheviks renewed their attacks south-east of Kalenkovich, where they captured a small strip of ground south of the Pripyat, without, however, regaining the railway line.

244. The Poles meanwhile had prepared an offensive against Kief, which began on the 25th April, by which date the Bolshevik troops on this front numbered 93,500 rifles. The Polish advance was extremely rapid, and by the 11th May they held the following line: Yampol, Lipovets, Tarascha, Kief, the line of the Dnieper to Bobruisk.

245. During the rapid Polish advance in the south, the Bolsheviks had been preparing a counter-offensive in the north, where they had massed 45,000 troops between Lepel and Drissa, and began their attacks on the 14th May. They advanced to the line Dolhinof–Postawi, but subsequently were forced by a Polish counter-attack to cede part of this ground.

246. A fortnight later Budienny's cavalry army (10,000 strong) broke through the Polish lines near Skwira (south-west of Kief), and, advancing rapidly, captured Berdichef and Jitomir. As the Bolsheviks in their retirement had cut the Iskorost–Kief railway, the Polish garrison in the latter town was isolated and had to fight its way out, and the Polish army retired to the positions held on the 24th April. Budienny, however, continued his successful advance, and after heavy fighting, captured Rovno, but did not succeed in taking Lemberg.

247. Further north the Poles held the line of the River Styr.

248. On the 4th July, when the general Bolshevik offensive started, their troops numbered 158,000 bayonets and sabres, which were concentrated mainly in the sector north of Borisof. The *moral* of the Soviet troops was excellent.

249. The line then ran approximately as follows: Novoushitsa, Proskurof, east of Lutsk the rivers Styr, Ptich, Beresina and Dwina. By the 25th July they had reached the line – Slonim, Volkovysk, Grodno, Vilna. They then re-grouped their forces for an attack on Brest-Litovsk and the River Naref, which they reached on the 3rd August. At this date the Bolshevik forces numbered 171,000 bayonets and sabres, and over 1,100 guns.

250. All was now ready for the projected attack on Warsaw; by the 13th August the Soviet troops had reached the line of the Warsaw bridgehead, which stretched from Gora Kalwaria via Radzymin to Modlin (Nowo-Georgievsk). On the night of the 14th August the Polish lines were forced near Radzymin, but during the 15th the position was restored. North of Warsaw the Bolsheviks reached the Vistula at several isolated points, the furthest point reached being Vlotslavek.

261. It was during this offensive that the volunteer army was formed under the direction of General Josef Haller.

252. The Polish counter-offensive began on the 15th August; by simultaneous attacks south and north of Warsaw the Bolshevik centre was forced to retire. Their *moral* gave way to such an extent that by the 19th they had lost Brest-Litovsk, while to the north large numbers were driven over the frontiers of East Prussia, where they were interned.

253. In the south, by the 27th August, the Bolsheviks had been forced back to the neighbourhood of Berdichef and the line of the Horyn. The Polish success was materially assisted by the disobedience of superior orders on the part of Budienny, who was tempted by the prospective capture of Lemberg.

254. No operations of any importance took place till the 24th September, when the Poles renewed their offensive and easily drove back their opponents

255. Meanwhile the negotiations for peace, which had been broken off during the summer, were renewed at Riga on the 21st September and eventually an armistice and a preliminary peace treaty were signed at Riga on the 12th October.

256. The situation of the Polish army at that date was as follows: On the right the Ukrainian troops had reached a line east of Novo-Ushitsa and Letichef; on their left the Polish troops held Novo-Konstantinof–Novograd Volinsk–Olevsk–

Slutsk–Koidonof–Molodechno, west of Smorgon–Svientsiany. Under the terms of the above convention, an armistice line was laid down as follows: Novo-Ushitsa, Novo-Konstantinof, Novo-Miropol, Novograd Volinsk, junction of River Striga and River Pripet, Slutsk, Mogilno, west of Koidonof, Radoskovichi, west of Sklyautsi, Oryechovo, River Dwina, east of Disna.

257. On this date the Polish army consisted of 22 divisions and 2 brigades, with 9 cavalry brigades, of which 4 armies of 20½ divisions and 7 cavalry brigades were on the eastern front, 1½ divisions in the interior reorganising, and 1 division (Zeligowski's 19th) out of control at Vilno.

258. Hostilities were to cease at midnight the 18th/19th October. In the north, Polish troops continued to march eastwards until they reached the armistice line, during which move slight brushes with the Bolsheviks took place, and a small body of Poles entered Minsk, but were withdrawn. All non-Polish troops, which had hitherto been operating with the Poles, were left on the east of the armistice line, and thus no longer in contact with the Poles, and consequently Permykin's troops were concentrated east of Kovno and operated with the Ukrainians, while Balahovitch moved east along the Pinsk–Gomel Railway. Savinkof joined him on the 10th October.

259. The preliminary Peace Treaty signed at Riga on the 12th October fixed the frontier between Poland and Russia and stipulated for the withdrawal of the Polish troops to that frontier, which movement commenced on the 20th November and was completed by the 2nd December.

260. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks concentrated forces against the Ukrainians and Permykin in Podolia, and against Balahovitch in the Gomel area. The former were driven back across the Zbrucz by the 22nd November and interned by the Poles, while Balahovitch's troops were similarly driven back by the 2nd December and likewise interned. Military operations on the eastern frontier of Poland were now over.

261. As soon as the Peace Treaty was signed, the Polish Government took steps to reduce their army and to withdraw part of it to the interior of Poland. The first troops to be withdrawn were the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th (Posnanian) divisions, the 21st (highland) division and the Siberian brigade, while the 22nd (volunteer) division was withdrawn for disbandment. A declaration was published by the Minister of War, pointing out the necessity for gradual demobilisation, and liberating students and volunteers. This was followed by an order stating that in the case of troops in the interior of Poland the 1895-1900 classes were to be retained and all others demobilised, while at the front the reduction was to take place more gradually. First the 1885 to 1889 classes, which had only been registered and not called up, were to be freed, then the 1890-92 classes were to be demobilised, and, finally, the 1893 and 1894, and 1901 and 1902 were to be demobilised before the end of the year, except in the cavalry, engineers and technical units. By the end of the year some 350,000 officers and men had been demobilised (N.B.—the term actually employed by the Poles is "dismissed on indefinite leave") and the Polish army consisted of 3 armies (11 divisions and 7 cavalry brigades) on the eastern frontier and 12 divisions (including Zeligowski's 19th) in the interior.

262. The total numbers (ration strength) of the Polish army at the date of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty were approximately 900,000, which was reduced to 550,000 before the end of the year.

The Navy.

263. Throughout 1920 the Polish Naval Department was advised and assisted by a British mission under Commander E. Wharton, R.N. The mission's work was concerned not only with the Polish navy, but also with the organisation and development of a Polish mercantile marine, and its activities covered the following questions :—

- (1.) The organisation of a training college near Danzig for the Polish mercantile marine.
- (2.) The drafting of a Marine Shipping Act for Poland.
- (3.) General considerations affecting the mercantile marine.
- (4.) The administration of lights and buoys, and the formation of a Hydrographical Department.
- (5.) The maintenance and internal economy of the torpedo-boats to be handed over to Poland by Germany under the terms of the armistice, or purchased from Great Britain,
- (6.) Liaison between the Polish Naval Department and the naval adviser to the High Commissioner at Danzig.
- (7.) Technical assistance to the latter on points affecting the port of Danzig.
- (8.) The establishment of wireless stations and the training of personnel.

264. Commander Wharton also acted unofficially as technical adviser to the Polish delegation during the negotiations in Paris which preceded the signature of the Polish-Danzig Convention.

265. At the beginning of the year the commissioned staff of the mission numbered five officers. At the end of the year this figure had been reduced to three, and finally, owing to the necessity for public economy, the mission was given orders to commence its total withdrawal from Poland on the 15th January, 1921. Commander Wharton was appointed British naval attaché to Poland, whilst the temporary retention of Lieutenant Buchanan, R.N., who had throughout been

largely concerned with questions affecting the Polish mercantile marine, was authorised until the arrival in Warsaw of the naval attaché.

266. The personnel of the Polish navy at the end of the year 1920 was composed of 110 executive, 20 engineer and 250 administrative officers and 2,400 men; of these, 80 officers and 600 men were fully trained.

267. The material of the Polish navy consisted of:—

- (a.) 6 ex-German torpedo boats.
- (b.) 4 small river monitors,
- (c.) 2 patrol crafts.
- (d.) 8 improvised river gunboats.
- (e.) 1 auxiliary training ship.

The 6 ex-German torpedo boats were reconditioning at Rosyth, the first pair to be ready for commissioning about the beginning of February 1921, and the others to be delivered at two-monthly intervals.

268. The monitors were built in Danzig to Polish design, and the last was completed in December. They have a speed of 12 knots fully loaded, and are armed with two 105 mm. field guns and four Maxims.

269. The patrol craft were purchased from the Finnish Government, whilst the river gunboats are Vistula steamers armed with two field guns and machine guns.

270. The purchase from His Majesty's Government of a light cruiser and four torpedo-boat destroyers was under consideration, as also the purchase of six coastal motor boats.